What is the role of legal limits on executive power, if any, when citizens demand more security from terrorism, and allowing executive officials legal flexibility of action appears necessary to achieve it? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and has legal flexibility to choose any policy it finds optimal, security from terrorism can actually decrease. In contrast, when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and there is an explicit legal limit on executive counterterrorism activities, security from terrorism increases. We also show that the executive achieves the objective of terrorism prevention more effectively when there are some limitations on its counterterrorism powers. The article provides a security rationale for legal limits on executive power and has implications for understanding how to design the institutional structure of liberal governments when the social objective is terrorism prevention.
To enhance their governments' capacities to p rorist attacks, the discretionary powers of th were promptly augmented in the United Stat liberal societies (Alexander 2006; Epifanio 2011; J 2006; Ramraj, Hor, and Roach 2005) . In turn, the executive's counterterrorism activities ha upon the rights and liberties of aliens and no particular. For example, in the United States, undertook scores of repressive counterterrorism ranging from ethnic profiling to increased restr immigration, to increased surveillance of cer and religious communities and even torture pected of terrorist activities (Herman 20 Such repressive counterterrorism policies ig public debate about the wisdom of executive Some scholars have argued that affording ex ficials legal flexibility of action has resulted in infringements upon the fundamental rights ties and noncitizens, and such outcomes are norm undesirable because they depart from establis democratic principles (Cole 2003) . Moreover, r policies may also subvert the legitimacy of coun ism efforts in the eyes of the members of the e religious communities in which potential terr terrorist groups have their roots. Yet such co could help terrorism prevention in multiple w pressing their opposition to radical activities d the potential terrorists; by speaking out publicly violence-inciting speech; and by providing val formation to executive agencies in charge of prevention (Donohue 2008; Wilkinson 2006) . T pressive counterterrorism policies are potenti
Other scholars have argued that executive di is essential to respond effectively to terrorist ac and thus the executive should be afforded legal to thwart security dangers (Paulsen 2004; Posn Tushnet 2005) . Without necessarily denying that nie and religious communities in which poten ists have roots are important in fighting terr presumption is that executive discretion inc rity from terrorism because there are polit on how executive counterterrorism powers a repressive policies would be harmful for terr vention, so the argument goes, the executive wil itself from undertaking such suboptimal coun ism policies because citizens can punish ineff of executive power at election times. Limitations utive action then may inhibit effective exercise power, especially when the executive is motiv vide security and responds to citizens' deman security. mostly taken as given the security policy adopted by the executive.3 We instead investigate the optimality of security policy to show that some legal constraints on exec tive counterterrorism actions are beneficial for preventin security crises. and India (Araj 2008; Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2012;  Our analysis thus suggests a novel rationale for legal Crenshaw 1995; Delia Porta 1995; Dugan limits and checks on executive powers. The traditional 2012; Gil-Alana and Barros 2010; LaFree Madisonian argument for such institutions is that they Korte 2009; Maoz 2007; Parker 2007 ; P stem abuses of governmental power and thus help pre-Perliger 2010; Wallace 2007; White 198 serve citizens' rights and liberties. Security crises chal-cross-national analyses (Daxecker and H lenge this very rationale. Times of duress are associated and Piazza 2010).6 These empirical findin with unfettered governmental powers and ordinary, regu-lowing puzzle: why would a rational govern lar situations with separation-of-powers and checks-and-ing to achieve security from terrorism never balances institutions. Without disputing the importance in repressive tactics that undermine it of constitutional limits and institutional checks within the and de la Calle 2009)? Our model show tradition of a liberal distrust of government, the analysis an equilibrium behavior for the execut here underscores another, perhaps less intuitive virtue: repressive policies that harm security fr such institutional arrangements can increase a govern-behavior induced by electoral incentives ment's capacity to prevent crises. Thus, they might be a rity from terrorism. necessary component of structuring the government if That electoral pressures on the execut the social objective is terrorism prevention.4 in terrorism prevention can have a perverse
The article contributes to a political economy litera-icy effectiveness can be a more general ture on terrorism (Crenshaw 1981) . The existing scholar-this regard, the article contributes to a ship on terrorism has addressed several critical questions toral accountability (Ashworth and Bue about terrorism prevention, including the optimal Fearon 1999; Ferejohn 1986 (Ferejohn 1986) or as selecti 2007) , terrorism recruitment and support (Siqueira and (Fearon 1999 ). In our model, government Shapiro and Siegel 2010) , and the effect of demo-whose actions also influence the respec cratic competition on terrorism (Aksoy and Carter 2012; come. In such settings, some limitations Chenoweth 2010), among other topics. However, re-action can be necessary for increased elect searchers have yet to determine whether enlarging exec-to not have counterproductive effects on pol utive discretion at the expense of fundamental rights and We proceed as follows. We begin wi liberties increases security from terrorism, even though model and then present the analysis. W nearly all prominent (liberty-reducing) counterterrorism some extensions and robustness exerci policies assume it does. framework, and, finally, we discuss some implications of Our results can also speak to an empirical literature our analysis, on terrorism and political violence. Scholars have noted that liberal democracies often resort to repressive policies and focus their coercive efforts on political, ethnic, or re-TllC Model ligious communities associated with a particular security threat.5 Scholars have also empirically shown that repres-There are three players: a representative citizen, an sive tactics at odds with fundamental liberal-democratic (elected) executive, and members of the communities 3 For an analysis of the optimality of security policy, see Dragu (2011). 4Although in a different setting than our model, for some recent analyses suggesting complementarities between separation of pow ers and electoral mechanisms, see Stephenson and Nzelibe (2010) . 5For a discussion of this observation, see Moore (2010) . sAlso, Siegel (2011) uses simulation techniques to show that repres sive policies can be counterproductive for terrorism prevention. The literature on political violence and insurgency has also found that collateral damage in the form of (noncombatant) civilian ca sualties can be counterproductive (Condra and Shapiro 2011) and that, on the other hand, improving governance and service provi sion reduces violence (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011). whose actions can affect terrorism preven plicity, we will refer henceforth to the latter (1 -p{s, i)) ■ [ug( 0) + nity. The executive chooses a level of (repressive) coun-(j) terterrorism activities that we denote by s € R+. The + f(s> *)[wg(l) + -R · ττ(Τ = community also chooses a level of activities to reduce , .... , , , . , ... , . . where π (I = i) is the reelection probability given the terrorism, which we denote by ι e κ+. Since terrorism ,. . , J . . . . Τ ... realization of Τ = 7 for 7 G (0, 11.
The community can also affect terrorism prevent by choosing a level of antiterrorism activities i. In pr tice, there is a range of community actions that redu the threat posed by terrorism. For example, commun members can discourage fellow members from provid active and passive support to terrorist groups, thus r ing the terrorists' ability to operate and plan attacks.
can also actively discourage extremism and violent act ities, thus increasing the costs of terrorism by making less acceptable activity. Community members can pro information to executive officials about suspicious act ities as well as about individuals who might be attract to radical ideas, who might be connected to terror prevention is an explorative activity that entails detect ing and disrupting terrorist plots before they mature into attacks, counterterrorism tactics such as drone strikes, coercive interrogations of suspected terrorists, or various surveillance activities are conducted in secrecy.7 Thus, the executive and the community choose their actions simul To capture these ideas, we assume that a higher ReclcctlOll DcClSlOU level of (repressive) counterterrorism activities, s, in duces community members to care relatively less about , ·.,,, , · r. 1 , .· . τ · U '
. ' ' We start with the analysis ot the election stage, which is terror prevention. Technically, we assume that Δ,(5) ξ , t . , . .,.
r ' ' very simple. I he representative citizen reelects the tncum M0, s) -Ml, s) > 0 (i.e., the community shares the bent executiv objective of terrorism prevention), but -M-2 < 0 (higher ^ ln ,, ., · . ... ,, , , .
' r 9s Γ =;,; 6 {0, 1}, there exists a critical level, in,·, such that level of repressive] counterterrorism activities reduces ., .· , . , r , , -c... ^ r, r ' the executive is reelected it and only it W > w, . Because the intensity with which the community members care TT ■ λ ■ · τ λ· ■ ■ w.ni u. . , ' Uγ is decreasing in I and increasing in W, it follows that about terrorism prevention). w0 < W\. Let q , = Prob(W > w;) de Also, the function cc(i) measures the cost of the ., ... . .· ·.· , . .. , cw that the representative citizen reelects the executive when community for engaging in terrorism prevention ac-T = . Note that ^ < tivities. We assume that the cost function is increasing , .· , , · , . , -c., a m b reelection probability is higher it the executive is more in i (i.e., -fM > 0) and is strictly convex in i (i.e., <-,· .· . . . .. , u 2 . successful in preventing a terrorist attack, a result that has ,ίΡ > ®)· a^so assume that lim,_».o g| = 0 and received empirical suppor that lim^oo = 00. In summary, the community's We use a simple probabil utility is resentative citizen because our primary focus is to as
sess the security rationale for executive discretion presumes that increased electoral incentives to pre (2) terrorist attack induce the executive t Alternatively, we can formalize the intuitive idea of a Security Policies-In the aPPendi negative effect of (repressive) counterterrorism activities foundatlon for our reelection by assuming that the community's preference for reducing which the policy outcome provides terrorism is independent of s but that the community's unknown level of the executlve's • 1 . c *· *· ν terrorist attacks and in which the representative citizen marginal cost tor terror prevention activities increases v with an increase in s, all else equal. That is, the community is Prospectively ration has a cost c(s, i) with a positive cross-partial, > 0. maximize utili ' tive has discretion to choose any action it finds opti decision whether to reelect or not to reelect the exec-, . ,c ■ , , . · . reduce terrorism, without facing any legal cons utive. The representative citizen s utility from reelecting ^ ^ interaction the dis the incumbent executive is UV(T, W), w ere W can e jn the next section, we anal thought of as the utility from nonpolicy attributes (i.e., r , , ,. ·. .· .... 0 ' , executive laces some legal limitations on its actions; we a valence parameter) and where W is a random variable , , , .,. . . ,, t · , .· " 1Ar r ' label this interaction the constrained executive game. We when the executive chooses s. We assume that Uy{T, W) is decreasing in Τ (i.e., the representative citizen dislikes wy. That is, W = Wj -W terrorist attacks), and increasing in W. The representative utility from reelecting citizen's utility from electing the challenger is [M.13 Because the incumbent exe the challenger she will face, we can think of W variable from the incumbent executive's perspect s.
H-r 12To see this, note that we can write those parts of 2 that depend on i as -p(s, i)Ac£(s) -cc(i), where Ac is a constant and ζ(·) 14The empirical connection between successful terrorism preven is a positive and decreasing function (such that Ac(s) = Αεζ (s)). tion and reelection outcomes appears strong. Using a large data set Dividing the objective function by ζ (s), an operation that does not consisting of more than 800 elections in 115 countries over the pe change the optimal i, yields -p(s, i)Ac -We can think of riod 1968 -2002 ,Gassebneretal.(2007 showthattheoccurrenceof r . . . · r .. ; ·, terrorism increases the probability that the incumbent government the fraction in this expression as a function c(s, 1). . , ■ , ,· ■ . <· , is replaced at the next election, dependi I3If the representative citizen's utility function is additively sepa-terroris rable in the utility from terrorism prevention and the utility from crease nonpolicy attributes, then we can think of W as the difference in terroris valence between the incumbent executive, Wh and the challenger, of a g 12To see this, note that we can write those parts of 2 that depend on i as -p(s, i)Ac£(s) -cc(i), where Ac is a constant and ζ(·) is a positive and decreasing function (such that Ac(s) = ΔΓζ (s)).
Dividing the objective function by ζ (s), an operation that does not change the optimal i, yields -p(s, i)Ac -We can think of the fraction in this expression as a function c(s, i).
I3If the representative citizen's utility function is additively sepa rable in the utility from terrorism prevention and the utility from nonpolicy attributes, then we can think of W as the difference in valence between the incumbent executive, W/, and the challenger, Wc-That is, W = W, -Wc, and thus th utility from reelecting the incumbent e Because the incumbent executive might the challenger she will face, we can thin variable from the incumbent executive's s.
14The empirical connection between successful terrorism preven tion and reelection outcomes appears strong. Using a large data set consisting of more than 800 elections in 115 countries over the pe riod 1968 -2002 , Gassebner et al. (2007 show that the occurrence of terrorism increases the probability that the incumbent government is replaced at the next election, depending on the severity of the terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks without casualties or injuries in crease the probability of a government change by only 1.3%, while terrorist attacks with at least one casualty increase the probability of a government change by 20.3%. compare the equilibria of the two games in the executive achieves the objective of tion and how the probability of a terrorist attac when the executive faces increased elector provide security from terrorism.
As mentioned, we can summarize the election by q\ and q0, which denote the reelection pro if Τ = 1 and if Τ = 0, respectively. Substi tt(T = j) in 1 and rearranging it gives us the ex objective function:
where Q ξ q0 -qx.
We now solve for the Nash equilibrium of the discre tionary executive game. Maximizing the executive's ob jective function, equation (3), implies that its optimal action is the solution of the first-order condition:
The executive's objective function is strictly concave feet the players' equilibrium actions and the equilibri in s because the second derivative is negative. Thus, there probability of a terrorist attack. Applying the impl is a unique optimal s. The community's objective func-function theorem to equation (4) gives tion (2) is also strictly concave in i, and thus the unique optimal i is the solution of the first-order condition: 3p(s, i)
The equilibrium of the game is the solution to the system of equations (4) and (5). Because (4) is indepen dent of i and because there is a unique solution of (5) for The Preceding expression is strictly positive, and every value of s, there is a unique equilibrium. We have therefore an increase in Q shifts the executive's best ihe following proposition: sPonse function to the right in Figure 1 . Intuitively, th increased responsiveness of the representative citizen to Proposition 1. The discretionary executive game has a successful terrorism prevention means that the executiv unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. now prefers to choose a higher level of (repressive) cou
The two players' response functions and the resulting terterrorism activities, s. The same logic applies to equilibrium are shown in Figure 1 . Applying the implicit increase in R>the executive's payoff from being in office, function theorem to equation (5), we can find the slope a consecluence> the equilibrium changes from (s , i of the community's best response function to be to (**· and while the equilibrium value of s increase the equilibrium value of i decreases. dp(s, i) 9Ac(s) di 9i ds ds d2p(s,i)
Because the security-enhancing aspect of a higher equilibrium level of s is counteracted by a reduction in the Ac(s) -c"(i) equilibrium level off, the overall effect on the equilibrium probability of a terrorist attack depends on which one of The preceding expression is strictly negative, and there-these effects is more important. Proposition 2 provides fore i(s) is decreasing in s. And because the optimal s is a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium independent of z, the executive's optimal response func-probability ofa terrorist attack to increase if the executive's tion in Figure 1 is vertical. electoral incentives to provide security from terrorism
Since the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equi-increase, librium, we can perform a comparative static analysis on how changes in the executive's electoral incentives to pro-Proposition 2. When the executive faces increased el vide more security from terrorism (i.e., increased Q) af-toral incentives to prevent a terrorist attack, the equilibrium , Δ, + < tives may not produce efficient security policies, as often assumed.
Legal Limits on Executive Power
Proof. See the appendix. □
The previous analysis suggests that when
Both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of responds to increased po expression (7) are positive. Therefore, for the probability security and has legal of a terrorist attack to go up when the executive has more finds optimal, secur electoral incentives to prevent a terrorist attack, the de-crease. In this section crease of the community's action, i, must outweigh the rationale for having s increase in the executive's action, s. This is more likely if terterrorism actions. To t 3p/3s is small in absolute value, so that the direct effect legal limit sres such t of the executive's action is limited; if dp/di is large in counterterrorism level absolute value, so that the reduction of the community's smaller than the equil action has a large effect on the probability of an attack; executive game, s*.15
if -A'c(s) is large, so that the negative marginal effect As mentioned, we la of executive action on the community's goodwill is sig-level of counterterroris nificant; and if ^Ac + c"c is small, which implies that such that € (I, s*)) as t the community's objective function is not very concave, ^he following proposit and thus marginal parameter changes in the community's sucfi fimits fi*at result i optimization problem have a large effect on the optimal as comPared to the dis value of i. Proposition 3. There exists an interval (£, s*) such that Also, the extent to which the executive reacts to in-the executlve's utlllty ts strictly higher when sres € {I, s creased electoral incentives depends on how secure the than in the discretionary executive game.
executive is of her reelection. Both an executive who is very secure and one who has only a very small chance Proof. See the appendix. □ of reelection will respond less to increased electoral in centives than an executive in a very competitive electoral Proposition 3 shows that some legal constraints on situation. However, this matters only for the size of the 5 are desirable even from the executive's perspective. The effect on security, not for its direction. reason is that such a constraint ameliorates the problem As mentioned, some researchers argue that execu-identified in the previous section in that the executive is in tive officials should have legal flexibility of action because some sense too aggressive for its own benefit and cannot elections induce correct incentives in terms of choosing restrain itself when facing increased electoral incentives to efficient security policies. That is, executive officials will provide security from terrorism. The restriction sres pro do their best to maximize security if this is what citizens vides a credible constraint on the executive. It encourages want. In particular, if the executive knows about the neg-cooperation by the community, which, for the executive, ative effect a higher level of s has on the incentives of the has large positive benefits while only leading to relatively community, the executive will refrain itself from choosing minor direct losses from the decrease in the level of s.
an inefficient level of s. Proposition 2 suggests that this ra-VVh next analyze how the executive achieves the obj ec tionale for executive discretion is not necessarily correct. tive of terrorism prevention in the constrained as com
When the executive has increased electoral incentives to pared to the discretionary executive game. In this con prevent terrorist attacks, the executive will do more of text, let the executive's utility from terrorism prevention what is under its control (i.e., increase s), irrespective of be defined as the benefits minus the costs of terrorism the effect on i because what matters for the community is the expected level of s, not the chosen level. As a re-,, , ..... r .... Otherwise, the limits on executive counterterrorism actions are suit, the executive does not have a marginal incentive to meaningless since t restrain itself in order to achieve more cooperation from tionary executiv 15 Otherwise, the limits on executive counter meaningless since the outcome is exactly the tionary executive game.
prevention, ug(0) -p(s, i)Ag -cg(s).16
following result: electoral incentives translate into a reduced equilibrium probability of a terrorist attack if the restriction sres is adapted optimally to the new demands. Because of reelection concerns, the execu-.... , . , , , ing decision-making procedures when th tive s incentive to prevent a terrorist attack is somewhat , t , . c . , r need to redraw the scope of governmental powers in or excessive in the discretionary executive game in that the , . , . , , ,f ·.. mu .. · 7 0 der to respond to popular demands for security. That is, executive will choose a higher level of s than what is op-ui . . ° r there can be external shocks, such as large-scale terrorist timal for terrorism prevention. Proposition 4 then shows " , , , . . ,. . " . t Κ r attacks, shocks that may require a readjustment in the that it is beneficial for the objective of terrorism preven-c. ,. ., , . , . , . . . .. 7 r scope of individual rights and consequently restrictions tion to restrict the executive by more than the executive . , . . t . 19 7 on executive power because citizens want more security, would prefer if the executive were to have legal flexibility γτ , . ,. . . . ^r ° 7 However, even when citizens want a readjus balance between security and liberty, Propositio James Madison argues in Federalist 57 that an ideal t , . . . ., .. , r . , .fi, ° suggest that it is not necessarily security-beneficial it the representative is one who cares about the public good , ., c . , r . , executive decides on the scope ot governmental power, but nonetheless is also responsive to electoral concerns. " ,, . rr-. , r r Overall, our results suggest an efficiency rationale for Note that we can think of the executive in our model as , , ,. t , .. legal limits on executive counterterronsm action a Madisonian representative; that is, the executive s util-. ^ .x. r , ,. .. .. r intuition for why some limitations on executive power ity in equation (3) is such that the executive cares about , , . r n τ ,, i· ,· 7 n . 7 help is as follows. In the discretionary executive game, the terrorism prevention, the public good, and reelection. . , . , , t . ,.
r , executive chooses its optimal action such that the direct Proposition 4 suggests that even in such a rather ideal , , r. , . r . , , r 00 benefits and costs of the marginal unit of s just balance situation for executive discretion, the objective of terror-, T . . , lL , 7 each other. In equilibrium, the executive knows that a ism prevention is better achieved if there are some legal , . , , , c , t. rr ^ .. . . . higher level ot s has a negative effect on the commu limitations on executive power. t r mtys incentives; however, the executive cannot credibly Propositions 3 and 4 show that it is beneficial to have ^ ,r , r . , , ^ , .
r restrain itself when facing increased electoral incentives a legal limit sres e (Z, s ) on the executive counterterror-t ., . r t . . . , ,.
° . to provide security from terrorism. A known legal limit ism actions. Next, we analyze a situation in which there . . . . on executive actions can serve as a commitment device might be a need to adjust the rules that govern the policy , . , , , σ 7 , , when the executive has incentives to respond to popular intended to prevent future terrorist attacks (i.e., sres) as , , c . 7n r . demands for more security, citizens demand more security from terrorism because ,»r , " · . r , , , , 7 We obtain our results in a framework where the elec of external shocks such as a large-scale catastrophic ter-, . . ., . r ° r toral incentives to provide security from terrorism are rorist attack. In the discretionary executive game, we ., , , , , , . r, , , ,, .. , , , . , , , . . provided solely on the basis ot the (observed) policy out showed that increased electoral incentives to prevent ter-^ r , , r come: a terrorist attack or no terrorist attack. Scholars rorist attacks can lead to an increase in the equilibrium , , . , t ... . , , ^ have also argued that a public perception that the exec probability of a terror attack. Proposition 5, in contrast, . ^ , c , ^ . r 7 r utive is tough on fighting terrorism has its own electoral rewards. Such a public perception can crea 16Note that this is just the executive's utility as defined in equation r , . , , , . , , , r (3) minus the reelection payoff, q0R -p(s, i)QR. for the executive to undertake even a hig titerrorism activities as compared to the equilibrium l
In the appendix (in the section where we provide a micro founda tion for the reelection rule), we model the representative citizen as having the same preference for the benefits and costs of terrorism 19An empirical literature suggests that the c prevention as the executive, which indicates that Proposition 4 can justments in the scope of individual rights w be obtained in a setup where the executive and the representative security threats (e.g., Berrebi and Klor 2008;  citizen have the same utility from terrorism prevention. meister 2009).
18If the legal constraint on executive actions is fixed, then neither 20This theoretical result is consistent with empi s nor i can change, and thus the probability of a terrorist attack ing a positive relation between the rule of law remains unaffected by changes in electoral incentives. vention (e.g., Abrahms 2007; Choi 2010; Findley 16Note that this is just the executive's utility as defined in equation (3) minus the reelection payoff, q0R -p{s, i)QR.
17In the appendix (in the section where we provide a microfounda tion for the reelection rule), we model the representative citizen as having the same preference for the benefits and costs of terrorism prevention as the executive, which indicates that Proposition 4 can be obtained in a setup where the executive and the representative citizen have the same utility from terrorism prevention.
18If the legal constraint on executive actions is fixed, then neither s nor i can change, and thus the probability of a terrorist attack remains unaffected by changes in electoral incentives. Fourth, we show that our results are robust if all players cretionary pow observe the legal limit with some error; that is, sres = example, a terror i + χ, where χ is some common observation error. diate state of emerg Our analysis shows that the equilibrium of the dis-wrought by the at cretionary executive game is relatively inefficient and that deal with widespr this inefficiency can be corrected by explicitly restricting as well as with the range of executive actions. One might conjecture that communication reputational mechanisms in repeated games can be an extraordinary me alternative manner of correcting the inefficiency. How-in certain areas o ever, the executive's ability to commit to a level of s lower tems. The powers than s* (by using reputational mechanisms) might be executive's action very limited for at least two reasons. of a terrorist attac First, reputational "folk theorem" arguments require Preventing a cris that players have strong interest in future payoffs relative utive officials act to the present (i.e., their discount factor is close to 1). purpose of discr However, elected officials' discounting is likely to be rela-ing about crisis pre tively steep because they always have to take into account interactions bet that they will be voted out of office. As a result, they will tors whose action be inclined to increase the chance of winning the next Our analysis show election, even if this might create problems in the future. gic interaction Second, the executive's ability to commit to a certain curity if citizens dem action depends on how effectively the community can It suggests that t punish the executive for deviations. However, the com-beneficial for sec munity's ability to punish the executive is limited because on executive po of the secrecy of counterterrorism operations, which is Second, th typically maintained for a substantial period of time. Be-tween constitu cause the delay with which the actions of the executive can arly and policy di 21 This is the case because if there are additional benefits from choosing a higher level s, then the executive's optimal s would be higher than the optimal s that solves equation (4). (Schmitt 1932) . In this account, legal limits then are but devices In this section, we present the proofs of Propositions 2 for restricting legitimate and effective usage of executive 5 and also provide a microfoundation for the reelection power. Plowever, the analysis presented here suggests that ru'e we used in the main analysis. some limitations on the exercise of executive power do not " r rri r Proofs of Propositions necessarily weaken but actually strengthen democratic processes to produce better public policies. In short, even Proof of Proposition 2 for the purpose of providing security, some legal checks Q on the equilibrium pro on executive actions can have a positive impact. given by totally differentiat
The analysis also has some implications for current yields policy debates about fighting terrorism. The dominant dp 9p(Sj f) d paradigm that shapes how we think about antiterrorism = ^ " ~Jq ^ policies posits a fundamental trade-offbetween civil liber ties and security from terrorism. This paradigm presumes that executive discretion is effective in reducing terrorism, and the only remaining question is whether liberty inter ests outweigh security gains. Yet, starting the debate on these grounds places the burden of empirical proof on Since ^ > 0 by (6), the sign opponents of executive discretion who must show high term in brackets, which sim liberty benefits of limiting the exercise of executive power. in the statement of the pr by sres) . of the proposition that -p(sres, ires)Ag -cg{sres) > Choosing sres > s* therefore effectively implements -p{s*, i*)Ag -cg(s*) follows immediately from the fact the same equilibrium actions as in the discretionary that both terms on the left-hand side are larger than executive game. If sres < s*, the community expects the corresponding terms on the right-hand side, because that s(sres) = sres and therefore maximizes uc(0, sres) -p(sres, ires) < p(s*, i*) and Ag > 0, and cg{sres) p(sres, i)Ac(sres) -cc{i) (i.e., 2 evaluated at sres). Dif-Cgfe*) because sres < s* by Proposition 3. □ , . , . , r-, , r "· ·/ , We now use a revealed preference argument to prove the which implicitly defines a best response function i{sres). r , ι ? , * τ , ., i ■ / \ * j r r -c * claim of the proposition. Suppose that Q < Q', i.e., the Note that ι(·) is a decreasing function of sres it sres < s .. The first two terms are the same as those in (4) and are as s a feasible choice and cannot get the ex therefore equal to zero; they measure the direct effects of higher payoff than the optimal action s . Similar changing sre5 at s*. The last term (including the minus rnality in case 2 requires that sign) is negative because |f < 0, f < 0, and the term _p2^^+Q2jRj_^(s2)>_pi^^+Q2J? in brackets is positive. This implies that there exists an interval of values for sres such that if sres € (£, s*), then ^ the executive's equilibrium utility increases relative to the Adding (8) and (9) analysis.
Let the probability of a terrorist attack be Since /(·) is a decreasing function of sres if sres < s* P(hk, s, i) = + p(s, i), where Qk represents a candi (for all sres > s*, i(sres) = ι *), it follows that ires > i*. date's type (where the type can be thought of as ability Together with sres < s* (by Proposition 3), this implies to prevent terrorist attacks) for k € {I, C}, and where I that p{sres, ires) can be larger or smaller than p(s*, i*). denotes the incumbent and C denotes the challenger.
From an ex ante perspective, there is symme certainty about θ^;23 that is, none of the players value of Qk. Let the ex ante expectation of θ*, be Also, from an ex ante perspective, 0k is equally to be high, 0^ > 0 (meaning that the candid competent than expected so that the probabilit cessful attack is higher than the average), or lo (meaning that the candidate is more competent pected so that the probability of a terrorist atta than the average).26
In any period of the game, let the representa zen's utility be defined as follows: Uv = ug (0) 25A variety of models in the literature on electoral accountability assume symmetric uncertainty.
26Note that we can set up the function p(s, i) and the distribution of such that 0 < Ρ(θ^, s, i) < 1.
27 Wi could also be interpreted as the utility from a candidate k's fixed characteristics in policy areas other than terrorism, for exam ple from fixed policy positions or the candidate's competence as in a probabilistic voting model or a differentiated candidates model (see, e.g., Krasa and Polborn 2012; Lindbeck and Weibull 1993) .
28This is the case because if the incumbent executive is reelected, the incumbent executive will have no reelection concern in the next period given that she can only be in office for two periods. 29That is, if the executive is uncertain will face when choosing the current peri uncertain about the valence difference W when choosing s.
Given the above expressions, we have the following: £(Θ;|Τ = 0) -£(θ/| Τ = 1) = (θ' -θί)2 < 0.
(2 -θ* -θ} -2ρ*)(θ| + θ? + 2ρ*)
Using this result in (10) implies that the incumbent executive's winning probability is higher if there is no ter rorist attack in the current period, which is similar to the reelection voting rule we used in our main analysis (i.e., the reelection threshold Wj is higher if the policy out come is Τ = 1 rather than Τ = 0, which implies that the reelection probability q0 is higher than qi). Furthermore, since uncertainty is symmetric, the expected probability of a terrorist attack is p{s, i) (taking expectations over Θ/), and thus all equations in the subsequent analysis are the same as in the main text.
